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Comments WelcomeAn important area of divergence within the EU in the last decade has
involved differences in the immigration policies pursued by member states,
with some countries, notably Italy, Spain, and Britain, pursuing far more
liberal policies than the standard in other EU member states, which, since
the end of active worker recruitment schemes in the early 1970s have
operated under a de facto zero net immigration goal (although this has not
always been achieved).   This divergence has been the source of tension, to
the extent that overly liberal immigration policies, in particular in Spain and
Italy, have been interpreted as undermining the objective of common border
controls vis a’ vis third-country immigrants by other members of the
Schengen area. It is also important in understanding why, in spite of a
common demographic need for immigrants to support economic activity and
efforts by the European Commission to promote a more pro-active, and
more liberal common immigration policy for the EU, key aspects of
immigration policy (including work-based immigration and family
reunification policy) continues to remain under the control of national
governments to this day.  Given Europe’s aging population,  the fact that it
is a major destination for immigrants from poorer regions and the world,
and the fact that the EU does have a common, highly developed framework
for intra-EU migration, this remains a significant, and very complex
problem in Europeanization. 
As part of a larger project that considers different reasons for the divergence
in EU immigration policies, I focus in this paper on the role of domestic
politics of immigration, and more specifically, on how governments of the
Left in four EU member states (Germany, Britain, Spain, and Italy) have
responded to the phenomenon of immigration over time.  The politics of
immigration in Europe are, at least partially, to be understood as partisan
politics. And there are reasons to expect that parties of the Left face
particularly difficult choices in responding to immigration.  
In what follows, I start with a discussion of the particular political dilemmas produced by
large-scale immigration. Thereafter, I offer a brief periodization of the immigration phenomenon
in Europe since the end of the second World War and a discussion of how governments of the
Left have responded to the phenomenon of immigration in the four countries being considered.
Overall, center-left governments have sought to reconcile immigration policy with broader
2economic objectives, but there have also been significant differences and unexpected departures
in their responses.  The paper concludes with a discussion of why governments of the Left in
these countries have pursued such different policies. 
I. Immigration and Partisanship 
Unlike other aspects of the social and economic context faced by the Left at the start of the
twenty-first century, the phenomenon of immigration in Europe is rarely treated as a
development with particular clear implications for partisan competition among mainstream
political parties. Indeed, setting aside the literature on the rise of the new Radical Right (e.g.,
Betz 1993; Kitschelt 1995) the scholarship has emphasized those aspects of the phenomenon that
apply equally across party lines.  It has regularly been argued, for example, that the politics of
immigration is primarily a matter of local politics: a comparative study of France and Britain
during the 1970s and 1980s proposed an “electoral geography” of immigration politics according
to which governments will opt to curtail immigration independently of partisanship whenever
electoral districts in which native citizens compete economically with immigrants for jobs and/or
public resources become crucial to the outcome of local elections. (Money, 1999)  The fact that
efforts to restrict immigration during the sixties and seventies in countries such as France and
Britain were promoted with equal intensity by local party politicians of the Left and the Right,
and that early efforts to limit immigration into France were pushed by local Communist Party
politicians well before the emergence of the Front National as a political force, reinforces the
sense that locality rather than party has often been the critical factor. (Schain, 2006)  Yet another
study has argued forcefully that  anti-immigrant popular mobilization in key electoral districts
was crucial in leading British Labour and the German SPD to toughen immigration laws in the
1960s and early 1980s. (Karapin, 1999)  Further adding to this view that the politics of
immigration are essentially party-neutral is the fact that many of the governments that were
quickest to restrict immigration after the 1973 oil shocks and the subsequent slowing of growth
were social-democratic in orientation -- including the Swedish, the Austrians, the Germans, and
the Dutch, whereas elsewhere the move was led by the mainstream Right (i.e. France).  
However, to observe that both Left and Right party governments have pushed for
immigration restriction in Europe, or for that matter, that immigration preferences tend to be
locally specific, does not obviate the possibility that parties of the Left and of the mainstream
Right face fundamentally different political dilemmas in deciding upon policies involving
immigration and immigrant rights. Indeed, there are at least two types of reasons to believe that
parties of the center-left face distinct electoral trade-offs in deciding upon such policies. The first
involves the economic impact of immigration on different segments of the electorate upon which
the Left relies. As a number of political economists have pointed out, just as trade policy has
winners and losers, immigration is likely to weaken the labor market position of native low-
skilled workers while improving the economic outlook of high-skilled workers and professionals
whose labor productivity and cost of living is actually raised by an increased supply of low-
skilled workers. (Sheve and Slaughter 2001)  Given that low-skilled workers also represent the
prime beneficiaries of publicly subsidized housing, health care, and education, and that they are
more likely to find themselves living in proximity to low skilled immigrants, competition in jobs
carries over to competition over such public resources and space. To the extent that voters view
immigration in terms of their rational economic self interest and that parties of the Left must put
together an electoral coalition spanning low-skilled workers, high skilled workers and
professionals, the Left is likely to face an electoral trade-off over immigration. Moreover, other
economic trends, such as the rise of the service economy and associated efforts to make labor
markets more flexible (such as, for instance, the recent Hartz reforms in Germany) are likely to
3aggravate such potential electoral trade-offs by reducing traditional forms of labor market
security for the working class  in Europe. 
In addition to the division over immigration policy that derives from the differing labor
market positions of the center-left´s potential electorate, political economists also postulate
another way in which immigration presents problems for such parties. To the extent that
immigration of low-skilled workers (the primary recipients of social transfers) changes the
income distribution so as to push former recipients up the relative income scale (turning them
into median voters), the preference of the median voter might well move towards lower spending
levels (Nannestad, 2007)  If so, immigration would represent a serious threat to the ability of the
center-left to protect the European welfare state, and with it a centerpiece of its raison d´ètre.
Secondly, while economists suggest that immigration is likely to divide the center-left´s
electorate along skill levels, this cleavage appears to strongly coincide with the cultural cleavage
between left-libertarian and authoritarian values which appears to be emerging as a major feature
of the attitudinal electoral space in which center-Left parties now operate. (Kitschelt, 1994,
1995)  While these divisions might well be linked to the new multiplicity of work experiences
among the Left´s potential electorate -- with male, manual workers threatened by globalization
tending to fall in the new authoritarian camp and professionals with higher educational levels and
communicative skills tending towards left-libertarian values – more basic issues might be at work
and preferences for or against immigration might not be a simple matter of rational expectations
regarding the impact of immigration on an individual´s labor market position. They may also
reflect antagonistic world views among the Left´s electorate that may harden to the point of
rendering the individual economic impact of immigration a secondary matter.  This cultural, or
identity, dimension of immigration cannot be fully eluded by the Left because any choice to
restrict immigration (or the rights of immigrants) in order to address the impact on native
workers involves some implicit or explicit justification for limits on social solidarity based on
identity.   Resort to such nationalist or nativist justification may undermine the perceived
ideological coherence of the center-left and threaten one of its key tools in mobilizing voters: the
appeal to universal values.  Worse yet, it may play into and thus strengthen similar appeals by
parties on the Right.  It may also directly alienate the left-libertarian segment of the center-left’s
electorate, contributing to partisan schisms such as that between Social Democrats and Greens in
Germany or those between the Socialist Party and alternative Left candidacies seen in recent
French presidential elections.
1 
Lastly, the economic argument about the way in which low-skill immigration may impact
the level of support for a generous welfare state also has its cultural and ideological counterpart
in phenomenon of “welfare chauvinism.”  Thus for Kitschelt (1995: 268) one of the principal
problems for the contemporary center-left is that “its quest to sustain a comprehensive welfare
state and a multiculturalization [sic] of advanced European capitalist societies may provoke a
welfare chauvinist backlash among the indigenous population that skilled rightist politicians may
incorporate into a broader right-authoritarian electoral coalition.”  Evidence of such welfare
chauvinism among European electorates as seen in public opinion surveys has been taken to
imply that the kind of social solidarity underpinning the creation of generous European welfare
states was premised on a cultural homogeneity that might be disappearing (Alesina et al. 2001).
Although the reasoning here is different, the predicted effect is similar to that suggested by the
economic argument involving the effect of immigration on the spending level preferences of the
median voter: it is to push European states towards lower levels of social solidarity, the essential
precondition for the social policies of the center-left. 
Both economic analyses pointing to the ways in which immigration impacts different sets
of voters and cultural analyses of the attitudinal trends characterizing European electorates in the
4post-Fordist period thus suggest that the European Left is likely to face considerable problems in
defining its stance on immigration policy in the electoral space it operates in.  Given the possible
tensions in immigration policy preferences among the center-left´s electorate, how have center-
Left parties in practice addressed the question of immigration and immigration policy in Europe
in the last decades? 
II. Immigration and the center-Left  in Europe: a brief periodization 
Setting aside migratory moves due to postwar expulsions, the history of postwar immigration in
Europe can be divided broadly into three periods. The first, lasting from the 1950s to the
economic crisis of 1973 saw significant levels of immigration into the richer states of Western
Europe through guest worker recruitment programs designed to address labor shortages and
Britain´s and France´s preferential treatment of former colonial subjects. The second period,
starting with the economic crisis of the early 1970s , was marked by the abrupt ending of active
worker recruitment schemes and  the curtailment of lax citizenship provisions for former colonial
subjects (the latter starting in Britain in the early 1960s).   This left only two modalities of
immigration into most states of Western Europe - family reunification and asylum laws - which
were often defended by courts and public administrations in the face of government efforts to
move to a de facto zero immigration goal.  The third period coinciding roughly with the end of
the cold war in 1989, was marked by a sharp increases in immigration levels occurring via those
two methods. It would end a decade later with a radical toughening of asylum laws across the
EU. Led by Germany, EU 15 member states rescinded their acceptance of asylum petitions for
those arriving through a  “safe-third-country” (a condition that applied to virtually all cases of
arrival into the EU 15 by land and many cases of arrival by air). Family reunification criteria
were also toughened by several countries (including Germany), resulting in very low net
immigration, or even a decline in the immigrant population. 
However, as Figure 1 makes clear, the recent choice to restrict immigration levels has not been
universal across Western Europe, with some countries choosing to allow for a considerable rise
in immigration at a time when others moved decidedly towards restriction. Some countries,
including most strikingly Britain, Spain, and Italy, have continued to experience very large
inflows of immigrants from outside the EU.
2  Indeed, the EU 15 area as a hole is estimated to
have seen an increase of new residents coming from outside the area.
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The most recent period has also been marked by such phenomena as the “securitization” of
immigration policy following the September 11 attacks and a new emphasis on border control in
the face of new, more organized forms of illegal immigration from the EU´s Southern and
Eastern borders. But it has also seen two other developments. The first is a great deal of attention
focused on the problem of cultural and economic integration of both first and second generation
immigrants. The second is the prominence of a new, still ongoing debate over how to make
immigration policies fit with other social and economic objectives such as competitiveness in the
face of global competition.  
If we consider the role of the political Left in this brief history, the first observation is that early
postwar immigration regimes across Western Europe did not seem to have had any particularly
partisan character. Guest worker programs were instituted by Christian Democrats in Germany
and the Netherlands, Gaullists in France and Social Democrats in  Sweden (Toro-Morn,  2004).
5In Britain, on the other hand, both Labour and Conservative governments up to 1962 supported
generous access for former British colonial subjects (see Hansen 1999). It is notable that, in the
case of guest worker programs designed to recruit labor temporarily without a pathway to
citizenship, social-democratic parties and labor unions alike were willing to go along with the
premise of recruiting foreign workers who would not enjoy full social and political rights. 
At the time of the postwar oil shocks, the Left was in a preeminent position across much of
Europe and Social Democratic governments in Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands took the
lead in ending worker recruitment schemes, often in direct response to pressure from labor
unions.
3  The British case stands apart in that the first important move to curtail immigration --
by making the right of Commonwealth citizens to abode contingent upon a government issued
work permit in the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act -- preceded the downturn of the 1970s
by more than a decade and was carried out by the Conservatives. Nonetheless, Labour continued
and intensified the Conservatives´ move to restrict Commonwealth immigration restriction by
drastically cutting work vouchers after coming to power in 1964 and passing the 1968
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which sought to halt the influx of migrants arriving from
African Commonwealth states.  
In the period after the oil shock, immigration policy across most of Western Europe seemed to
reflect a broad consensus between center Left and moderate Right parties to stop the influx of
foreigners and with it the transformation of European societies in a multicultural direction.  No
less an internationalist than Willy Brandt would declare in January 1973 that it had “become
necessary to think carefully about when our society´s ability to take up [foreigners] is exhausted,
and where sense and responsibility require a halt.”
4 The consensus was also reflected in what, in
hindsight, appears as an unspoken agreement between the center-left and the center-right not to
politicize the issue. In many parts of Europe, from France to Austria and Denmark, this political
principle would be challenged by the electoral rise of anti-immigrant parties starting in the early
1980s, which led sections of the mainstream Right to call for restrictions on immigrant rights in
the language of law and order (France’s “Pyrefitte law” of 1981 and subsequent “Pasqua
laws” (1986 and 1993) represent prime examples).  In other places - notably Germany – the
unspoken agreement seemed to hold until the asylum crisis of the early 1990s.
 The sharp rise in asylum seekers that resulted from the conflict in the Balkans following
the end of the Cold War (and coinciding with the intensification of other civil conflicts, such as
that in Algeria) would present a particularly challenging issue for the Left, which regarded this
political right as a key guarantee against the kind of political persecution experienced during
fascism. As a consequence, Left party politicians often sided with courts that blocked early
restrictions by governments of the Right.  In the end, however, the combined pressure of anti-
immigrant mobilization and increased politicization of the issue by the radical, and later the
mainstream Right, led center-left governments to accept a radical curtailment of asylum rights,
first in France and later in Germany and its neighbors.
 In 2005, the policy of rejecting asylum seekers that had passed through a “safe third
country” was adopted as the common guideline of the EU Council common asylum standards
directive.  At the same time, many governments in Europe toughened requirements for family
reunification visas, by far the main route for immigration into all EU countries since the 1970s.
The method whereby this has been done varies from lowering the age up to which children can
be brought on this basis (up to the age of 12 years in the case of Germany, 15 in the case of
6Austria), raising the age at which marriage takes place for a valid spousal application (to 24 years
in the case of Denmark, 21 in the case of the Netherlands), or increasing the sponsor´s income
and-or housing requirements, as was done in France and the Netherlands. Some of these
measures have been taken under governments of the Left and some by governments of the Right.
Yet, even in the latter cases, the center-left has generally failed to reverse restrictions after
returning to power. The upshot of these developments in the areas of asylum and family
reunification, added to the earlier curtailment of work-based immigration schemes, has been a
general tightening of avenues for legal immigration into the EU. 
 Nonetheless, as the diverging lines in Figure 1 reflect, the turn towards immigration
restriction has not been a uniform trend across the EU 15. In at least three countries -- Britain,
Italy, and Spain -- governments (including, notably, governments of the center-left) have pursued
far more liberal policies, allowing for large increases in the size of immigrant populations. Below
we consider the details of immigration policy in these three countries and place their experience
alongside that of Germany, the country that arguably has taken the most restrictive turn in its
immigration regime over the last decade and has done so during the center-left´s tenure in power.
III. Diverging Choices: Immigration policy under the center Left in Germany, the UK, Italy, and
Spain  
Germany 
Germany has long been one of the premier destinations for immigrants in Europe. At 12.9 the
proportion of its population that was foreign born in 2005  was equal to that of the United States
and, until recently, the second highest in the EU (only Austria, with a foreign born population of
13.5 percent had a higher percentage in 2005 (see Figure 2)).
5 Nonetheless, immigration did not
constitute a major point of contention between the postwar Right and Left until the 1980s. The
German Social Democratic Party (SPD) showed few differences in its approach to immigration
from the mainstream of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) during Germany’s economic
miracle years. Both the CDU and the SPD backed the recruitment of foreign guest workers with
limited rights of residence in the 1960s, and the CDU supported the ending of the program when
the SPD declared a recruitment ban on foreign workers in 1973, thereby effectively ending
work-based immigration. In the subsequent period, both the CDU and SPD leadership supported
the view that Germany was “not a land of immigration” (a phrase most often associated with
Helmut Kohl but previously deployed by Helmut Schmidt).
6 This was also reflected in both SPD
and CDU governments’ commitment to Germany’s ius sanguinis principle for citizenship status,
which precluded large numbers of children of guest workers born in Germany from attaining
citizenship. In all these ways, Germany’s postwar immigration policy reflected a consensus
among the center-Left and center-Right that immigration was acceptable as an economic
imperative but that there was a social limit on the extent to which Germany could integrate
foreigners. This position appears to have reflected a strong fear on the part of the German
political elite of the potential for xenophobic political mobilization among the German public
(Karapin 1999).
7  Hence, prior to the 1980s, there was little politicization of the issue at the
national level (Zaslove, 2007).  
Insert Figure 2 here
What would ultimately threaten this cross-elite consensus was the arrival, beginning in the late
1970s, of significant numbers of political asylum from places like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Turkey
and Vietnam. (Karapin, 1999)  Both the SPD and the FDP remained formally committed to
7Article 16 of Germany’s 1949 Basic Law, which allowed asylum seekers whose applications had
been rejected at the administrative level a strong right to appeal deportation through the German
courts. Yet, anti-immigrant mobilization by far right groups in the Federal Republic’s Southern
regions led segments of the CDU and the CSU to push for stricter asylum laws in the course of
the 1980 national elections. In the run up to the elections, the CDU-controlled regional
government of Baden-Wuertemberg and the CSU government of Bavaria announced their own
restrictions on asylum-seekers, a move later seconded by the SPD mayor of Essen. These
decisions were inspired by local protests against the settlement of asylum seekers in particular
localities and neighborhoods.  The threat that such popular mobilization would spread led the
Schmidt government to pass special visa requirements for citizens of Afghanistan, Ethiopia and
Sri Lanka just prior to the elections. However, stronger measures were for the time precluded by
the constitutional status of Germany’s asylum law, which could only be changed by a two-thirds
majority vote in the Bundestag.
It would only be with the arrival of far larger numbers of asylum seekers in the early 1990s that
the SPD would agree to give the Kohl government the necessary parliamentary support for such a
constitutional reform. The 1993 amendment of Article 16 voided the right of asylum for those
having passed through a ¨safe-third country”  on their way to Germany, that is, in practice, a vast
majority of cases.  At the same time, asylum-seekers, who had already been excluded from
obtaining work in Germany, were shifted from the protection of the Federal Social Assistance
Act to a separate social assistance regime that provided fewer cash benefits along with food
vouchers, a measure that clearly stigmatized this part of the immigrant population.  SPD support
for such radical measures to restrict asylum applications appears to have been motivated by the
extensive wave of anti-foreigner violence that took place following German unification, which
peaked with a figure of 3,365 attacks on foreigners in the first half of 1993, and the subsequent
wave of intra-German migration (Human Rights Watch 1994, ; Karapin 1999).  The virtual
closure of the asylum route of immigration into Germany is reflected in the sharp curtailment of
the previously rising number of foreigners residing in Germany from 1994 on (see Figure 1).  
After returning to power in 1998, the political Left in Germany took two major steps
intended to create a new immigration regime that would be politically more tenable. First, with
the rate of net inflows of foreign residents slowing to a halt, and responding to growing concern
over the integration of second generation immigrants, the Red/Green coalition led by Gerhard
Schroeder ran on a campaign promise to reform Germany’s century old law conferring
citizenship only on the basis of ancestry rather than birth.  The new law, adopted in 1999, made it
possible for the children of immigrants born in Germany and meeting particular conditions to
apply for German citizenship. Indeed, in its original proposals, the government sought to make
possible such applications without requiring applicants to renounce their existing citizenship, a
matter crucial to the offspring of Turkish and Polish immigrants for whom abandoning their
traditional nationality implied giving up inheritance rights in their parents´ country of origin. In
the end, the Schroeder government was dissuaded from insisting on the possibility of dual
citizenship by the outcome of an election in Hesse, where the CDU successfully used the
nationality law as a wedge issue to win control of the regional government.
8  The new citizenship
law passed in 2000 nevertheless held great symbolic importance, for it shattered the principle
that Germany was not a land of immigration. This alone was seen as a step forward in promoting
the social integration of second generation immigrants. Yet, because of the exclusion of dual
citizenship, it resulted in citizenship applications by only a fraction of Germany’s
disenfranchised second generation immigrants (around 750,000 of the original three million
predicted by the government).
9
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Secondly, the Schroeder government attempted to pass a new immigration law that would have
re-opened the door for work-based immigration, although only for high skilled workers.  The so-
called “Schily Law” (named after the coalition’s interior minister, Otto Schily), aimed to alter the
skill profile of immigrants by significantly toughening the standards for family reunification (the
one remaining traditional avenue for immigration) while replacing the ban on work-based
immigration with a points based system that would have allowed the extension of residence
permits for highly qualified workers in areas in which German employers faced labor shortages.
10
The re-initiation of labor immigration was pushed heavily by German business associations
which put strong pressure on both the SPD and CDU  in favor of the law (Ette 2003). On the
other hand, a toughening of family reunification criteria (in particular a lowering of he age up to
which children could join their parents from 16 to 12 years) was pushed by both the SPD and the
Christian Democratic opposition, which argued that the age should be lowered to 10 years.
Family reunification was held to be responsible for the low-skill profile of Germany´s immigrant
population because it necessarily built on and so largely perpetuated the low-skill character of
the earlier guest-worker policy. The law also created new integration requirements in the form of
language tests for the extension of residency permits. Pushed by the Greens, however, it also
expanded the criteria for political asylum to gender and non-state based persecution.
Although the Red-Green government legislated such a policy in 2002, it was successfully
challenged in court on a procedural matter by the CDU, who argued adamantly against any re-
initiation of work-based immigration and against any expansion of the criteria for political
asylum. The final version of the law, passed in 2004 with the support of the CDU in the upper
house, excluded the SPD’s centerpiece -- the points-based system of labor immigration. It thus
maintained the ban on work-based immigration, allowing only for three exclusions: one-year
visas for foreign students after they finished their studies in Germany; permanent residence
permits for top level scientists and managers; and temporary residence permits for self-employed
foreigners investing over one million Euros in designated economic activities (Műnz 2004). As a
concession to the Greens Party, it did include gender and non-state based persecution as criteria
for refugee, although not political asylum, status.
11  The SPD government´s major objective, to
create an immigration policy regime that would alter the skill profile of immigrants from low
skilled to high skilled workers was thus blocked, leaving simply an even more restrictive
immigration regime than the one Germany had already adopted in 1993. 
The United Kingdom
By contrast to Germany, Britain´s initial postwar immigration regime was not driven primarily
by economic considerations but by geopolitical ones. After the war, Labour passed the British
Nationality Act of 1948, which turned British subjecthood into British citizenship giving large
numbers of former colonial subjects an automatic right to migrate to the UK. Yet, far from a
partisan measure, this generous immigration policy represented a straight continuation of prewar
policy which had  aimed to protect Britain’s preeminence within the Commonwealth in a post-
colonial era through the creation of Commonwealth citizenship (Hansen 1999: Karatani and
Goodwin-Gill 2003) The permissive stance towards Commonwealth immigration implied in
Labour’s nationality act thus enjoyed the full support of the Conservative party, which, in turn,
would allow the arrival of large numbers of former colonial subjects for permanent settlement in
the UK after returning to power in the 1950s. 
9However, this liberal consensus on postcolonial immigration would be shattered by the outbreak
of anti-foreigner, and specifically anti-black, violence at the end of the 1950s, which was seized
upon by a populist wing of the Conservative Party epitomized by Enoch Powell (Karapin 1999).
In response to a large number of petitions for immigration controls from local party chapters, the
McMillan government passed the first significant step toward immigration restriction with the
first Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962, which rendered the right to settle in Britain
subject to government issuance of a skill-based work permit. Although the Labour Party initially
opposed the measure and worked to protect the right of dependents to accompany work permit
holders in the passing of the 1962 act, it engaged in a dramatic about face on immigration policy
after winning the 1964 elections. The new government of Harold Wilson sharply restricted the
number of work vouchers, entirely abolishing the category of unskilled labor and significantly
reducing that of skilled workers in 1965.  In 1968 it passed the second Commonwealth
Immigration Act with the aim of preventing the immigration of Kenyan Asians. The new act for
the first time distinguished between “patrial” British citizens (those of British birth or descent)
and other Commonwealth citizens, thereby bringing non-white immigration to Britain to a virtual
end (Hansen 1999).
12  At the same time, Wilson sought to balance this anti-liberal turn in
immigration policy by introducing anti-discrimination legislation in the 1968 Race Relations Act.
If British Labour, like center-left parties elsewhere in Europe, took a populist stance in restricting
immigration during the 1970s, it has played a very different role over the last decade. As Figure 1
illustrates, after more than a decade of sharp decline in the number of foreigners living in Britain
during the Thatcher years (and only a modest reversal of this trend in the first half of the 1990s),
the Labour victory of 1997 set the stage for a significant increase in immigration into Britain
(most of it from non EU member states). Taking the view that immigration could be beneficial to
Britain´s economic modernization when and where it supported economic activity, the Blair
government set out on a two pronged strategy of expanding the issuance of new work permits for
third country foreigners while at the same time moving to deter asylum applicants who it
identified as a burden on Britain´s purse. In its 1998 White Paper titled “Fairer, Faster and
Firmer – A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum,” the new government decried
“backlogs, inadequate control resources, and outdated procedures” in the existing system of
asylum review which made “it extremely difficult to deal firmly with those who have no right to
be here,” (Home Office 1998, paragraph 3.3). At the same time it began to increase the number
of work permits granted for those seeking employment in key sectors.  In 2002, Labour
introduced the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme, arguing that legitimate, work-based
immigration could bring “huge benefits: increased skills, enhanced levels of economic activity,
cultural diversity and global links” (Home Office, 2002: 9). It also increased visas for low-
skilled, casual work. The following year, Blair promised to halve new asylum applications while
moving Britain to a points based system of immigration. “Operating at different ends of the
employment spectrum”, all of these initiatives were intended “to improve the supply of labour to
the UK economy, to ‘meet the challenge’ of a globalizing environment.” (Walters 2004: 239).
The effect was a sharp upward turn in the number of foreign citizens residing in Britain, from
just under 2 million in 1996 to almost 3.5 million in 2006, the overwhelming majority non-EU
citizens (OECD, 2007).  
Spain and Italy 
Britain’s move to managed, skill-based migration under Blair represents one of the major turns in
European immigration policy in the last decades. Nonetheless, two other member states that in
the past served as major sources of emigration to the rest of Europe -- Italy and Spain -- account
10for a much greater share of the expansion in immigration that the EU has experienced over the
last two decades.  Italy’s registered immigrant population rose over the period 1989 to 2006 from
just under half a million to over two and a half million.
13 Spain’s transformation has been even
more spectacular. In just over a decade, the country has seen immigration (measured in terms of
resident foreign citizens) rise from marginal levels (under 400,000 in 1991) to the highest level in
the EU in proportion to total population. By 2008, foreign citizens residing in Spain, at over five
million, represented just over 11 percent of the population (El País, June 20, 2008). 
This dramatic rise of immigration into the two Southern member states is often attributed to the
restrictive turn in other EU15 states and to the difficulties Spain and Italy have had in controlling
illegal immigration due to shortcomings in border control and a lack of internal controls on the
employment of illegal migrants. Scenes of boatloads of African migrants arriving in Lampedusa,
the Canary Islands or Spain´s Southern coast, and of the dramatic human tragedies often
associated with these attempts, dominate press coverage of the phenomenon.  Yet, however
dramatic and significant, illegal arrivals by sea represent a small fraction of immigration in the
two countries (19,900 for Italy in 2007, 18,000 for Spain according to the UNHCR).
14  The
dramatic increases in registered immigration in fact stem from clear choices on the part of the
Spanish and Italian governments that have produced a far more liberal stance on immigration
than what is now prevalent in the Northern states of the EU15.   The key features of this liberal
stance in the two countries have been 1) permissive family reunification rules, 2) generous terms
for the issuance of work permits in sectors deemed to have particular labor needs, 3) the
extension of social rights to both legal and irregular immigrants, and 4) repeated amnesties for
irregular migrants who can show employment. While different in some significant ways (in
particular in regards to the use of immigration amnesties), the immigration regimes developed
and maintained by the two Southern member states thus bear a significant resemblance to the
more expansive work-based immigration regime introduced in Britain. 
  
One way in which the Spanish and Italian cases nonetheless are different from the British is that
the policies allowing for large scale immigration in the two southern states have been carried out
with almost equal intensity by governments of the Left and Right. This is particularly striking in
the Italian case, where governments of the Right in the last two decades have included the
Northern League, a party formation with an explicit stance against immigration whose leaders
often engage in xenophobic appeals. When the Right has been in power in Italy, its pattern has
been to pass tough, and even jarring ¨law and order” measures that make headlines (most
recently the discriminatory treatment applied to Romanian gypsies), without actually restricting
the overall levels of immigration.  Thus, for instance, the Berlusconi government of 2001
expanded the total yearly quota for third-country (non EU) migrants from 89,000 in 2001 to
170,000 in 2006 (Cuttitta 2008).
15 And the  Bossi-Fini law that it passed in 2002 (which required
the expulsion of immigrants whose residence permits had not been renewed and for the first time
linked new residence permits to the prior attainment of work contracts)  was accompanied by the
largest immigration amnesty Italy had ever seen. It resulted in the legalization of almost all of the
700,000 immigrants who applied. (Migration Policy Institute 2004).  Meanwhile, in Spain, the
center-right Partido Popular passed its own amnesties for illegal immigrants in 1996, 2000, and
2001 and in the process approved approximately 400,000 applications (Maas, 2006).  
If governments of the Right have thus been surprisingly liberal in their immigration policies in
Italy and Spain, the Left has generally gone further.  In the case of Italy, the center-Left in 2006
successfully ran on a platform of easing the immigration restrictions that had been imposed by
11the Bossi-Fini law. The Prodi government subsequently adopted an open-door immigration
policy, abolishing the requirement of prior work contracts for the granting of residence permits.
And, while it sparked controversy across the EU in 2007 when it legislated the expulsion of EU
immigrants charged with violent crime (a measure taken in response to popular outcry over a
spike in crime attributed to Romanian immigrants), its policies for granting residence and work
permits to foreign applicants remained among the most liberal ever seen in the EU (Chaloff,
2005). Meanwhile, in Spain, the Socialist government that took office in 2004 went on to pass
Spain´s most generous immigration legislation yet, granting full access to health care, education
and other social services to both legal and illegal immigrants, and passing an amnesty
regularizing the status of over 600 thousand further immigrant residents who could prove that
they had employment.  
IV. Conclusions
As the cases discussed above suggest, there has been ample room for difference in the stance
towards immigration taken by governments of the Left in Europe. Germany´s SPD in 1993 went
along with a constitutional revision that set the stage for a toughening of asylum rules not only in
Germany, but across the EU. Later, when in government, it attempted to shift to a selective, skills
based immigration regime that would have raised the skill profile of Germany´s immigrant
population (an attempt at which it failed due to opposition from the Christian Democrats). And,
while the Red-Green coalition government sought to improve integration by changing the basis
of German citizenship law and requiring language courses for the renewal of residence permits, it
also toughened the criteria for family reunification, the main channel for low skill immigration
into Germany. The result has been a virtual freeze on net immigration into Germany over the last
decade. 
By contrast, in Britain, New Labour under Blair opened the doors of the British labor market to
new immigrants from outside the EU. At the same time, it shifted immigration into Britain from a
rights based system to a skills based system that gave access to those types of migrants demanded
by British business, both at the high and the lower ends of the skills spectrum. Rather than take
the view predominating in Germany that there is a trade-off between allowing higher levels of
immigration and achieving immigrant integration, New Labour in Britain also facilitated labor
market access for spouses and children of those being recruited as a means towards successful
integration. Only in the face of a worsening electoral outlook and heightened anger from the
unions at the inflow of large numbers of low skilled workers did  the Brown government opt to
restrict immigration of third country nationals who do not fall within the high skills category,
promising 500,000 new “British jobs for British workers.¨(The Guardian, September 10, 2007).
On the other hand, the outbreak of wildcat strikes across British oil refineries and energy
companies in early 2009 suggests that 
Finally, in Italy and Spain, the two countries accounting for the largest increases of third country
immigration into the EU over the last decade, both Left and Right party governments have
chosen to allow for high levels of immigration. While governments of the Right (in particular in
Italy) have sought to counteract the perception of this reality through headline catching “law and
order” measures, Left parties have distinguished themselves primarily in extending social rights
to immigrants, including non-regularized ones,  as a way to promote integration. In both
countries, governments have made ample use of amnesties to bring illegal migrants into the
formal economy. On the other hand, as in Britain, they have based the issuance of work permits
12for new immigrants on a selective system favoring sectors facing labor shortages, ranging the
gamut of skill levels from construction and domestic work to information technology. 
If on theoretical grounds parties of the center-left are likely to face particularly strong electoral
conflicts over immigration policy, how are we to account for the observed differences in the
immigration policy choices, in particular as regards to the overall levels of immigration allowed?
One common explanation, the presence or absence of an electorally viable radical Right, does not
prove adequate in accounting for the differences among these four cases, as the radical Right
does not represent a serious electoral threat in national or even regional elections in Germany,
whereas it does have significant electoral weight in Italy and even participates in government.
Nor can the choices be attributed to the existing levels of the immigrant population, given that
Germany’s share of immigrants, while high, had been surpassed by 2004 by Spain, where the
Socialist government chose to pass yet another amnesty and expand the social rights of illegal
immigrants. 
A different and more convincing explanation of the contrast between the German SPD’s choice
in favor of immigration restriction and the more liberal stances of center-left governments in
Britain, Spain and Italy would focus on the ways in which immigrants are economically
integrated in the different countries. Looking first at the labor market, one striking contrast
between Germany and the other three cases involves the significant unemployment gap in
unemployment rates between immigrants and the native population.  In 2005 unemployment
stood at  17.5% for foreign-born men as compared to 10.6% percent for native-born men, and at
16% for foreign-born women versus 10% for native-born women. In the UK and Spain, these
gaps were considerably smaller: in the UK, only a 2.8 percent difference for men, and a 3.4
percent difference for women; in Spain, only a 2.5% difference for men and a 1.5% difference
for women.  In Italy the situation was slightly different, for unemployment was actually a bit
higher for native-born men – 6.2% as opposed to 6% for foreign-born men, though somewhat
lower for among women.  Still, the contrast with Germany is striking.  Moreover, in both Spain
and Italy, the labor market participation rates of foreigners was considerably better than that of
native-born citizens ( 81.6% as compared to 69.4% for men and 46.7% as opposed to 45.3% for
women in Italy; in Spain 79.5 as opposed to 74.4 percent for men and 60.4% versus 50% percent
for women) (OECD 2007), 
The reasons for this comparatively poorer labor market performance of immigrants in Germany
are complex but would seem to involve serious obstacles to labor market integration by
foreigners and their children entailed in German legislation, the low skill profile of the immigrant
population compared to the native population (an inheritance from the low-skill focus of the
guest-worker program), and the fact that the German economy is particularly bad at generating
low-skill employment as compared to all three of the other cases (Constant and Zimmermann
2005). This would imply that the Left in Germany faces a particularly acute conflict between the
interests of its low skilled electorate and immigrants. Thus, it is noteworthy that, precisely at the
time that it introduced its first new immigration law, the Schroeder government was seeking to
address the high unemployment level among low skilled workers through radical reform of the
labor market , including the introduction of more flexible employment contracts in the service
sector and major cuts in unemployment pay. The so-called Hartz reforms were highly
controversial, threatening the SPD´s internal integrity. In this context, slowing the inflow of new,
low skilled workers must have appeared as a good way to ease tensions in the labor market, and
with it, the potential electoral cost of the labor market reforms. 
13While this may explain why the center-left in Germany would be under particular pressure to
restrict immigration, it does not explain why similar governments in the other three countries
would not also act on such pressure, even if it were less intense. Here it must be said that Britain
´s managed migration policy, even prior to Brown’s clampdown on low-skilled, third-country
immigration, did involve features that allowed the government to keep a grip on the amount of
political tension that immigration might create among its voters. By limiting immigration to
either high growth or high skill sectors, the managed migration policy also allowed the
government to limit immigration in lower growth sectors where it might have a more obvious
impact on lower skilled native workers.
An alternative explanation for Labour´s original open door policy might be found in the
weakness of British labor unions, which would have been in a poor position to resist Blair´s new
open door policy towards migrants in the face of consistent pressure from British business in
favor of a liberal immigration policy.  Indeed, the outbreak  in early 2009 of wildcat strikes
protesting the hire of Italian and Portuguese workers in British oil refineries and energy
companies illustrates the weakness of organized labor in influencing the Labour governments’
immigration policy and the consequent sense of frustration among blue collar workers.
However, it would be difficult to make a similar case about Italy, where unions strongly opposed
the immigration restrictions imposed in the Bossi-Fini law, or Spain, where the Zapatero
government has based immigration policy on tripartite agreement and where the unions
participate in setting annual immigration quotas.
16  Indeed, looking at the actions of unions with
regard to immigration policy in the latter two countries, it is noteworthy that their position on
immigration has remained generally very favorable (Watts 2000).   
A different factor which the UK shares with the two Southern European cases and that sets all
three countries apart from Germany has to do with characteristics of the welfare state and the
role that immigration plays in the provision of key care services. Given its residual character, the
UK´s welfare state is quite weak in the provision of services such as child care or elder care
(Ungerson 2003). Consequently, there is high demand for cheap immigrant labor both from
institutional employers such as nursing homes and hospitals and from private households in all
three countries.  Comprehensive data on such employment is difficult to attain. Yet there is
evidence of the important role that immigrants play in providing such services not just in the UK,
but in all three countries. In the UK, for instance, a high proportion of nurses and elder care
providers are from the Philippines (Lyon and Glucksman 2008). In Italy, 34% of the almost 700
thousand immigrants regularized during the 2002 amnesty applied on the basis of employment in
domestic work, and according to one report, immigrants account for over 43 percent of such
employment. And in the case of Spain that figure is believed to be above 52% (Eiro Online 2006,
2007).  
This role of (primarily female) immigration in the provision of key services is important because
it suggests that significant segments of the center-left’s electorate, including in particular
members of households dependent on two incomes (which require external help with child or
elder care in the absence of publicly provided care services) will have a very concrete personal
interest in a liberal immigration regime. The fact that the rise of female immigration has
coincided with a  rise of (native) female labor market participation rates in the two Southern
European countries attests to the importance that immigrant labor plays in the role of many two
income families.(Chaloff, 2005)  Such a pattern of immigration that serves to compensate for the
14short-comings of residual and/or incomplete welfare states (such as characterize the two
Southern cases) also creates an infrastructure of personal contacts that is likely to serve to
counter anti-immigrant sentiment in the population. By contrast, where care services are
provided by the state either in the way of public provision or by luring mothers out of the job
market through generous family allowances, this type of private stake in immigration is likely to
be lacking. 
These observations also speak to the question of the relationship between immigration and
welfare states. Whereas economists have tended to interpret the higher levels of immigration in
the Anglo-Saxon countries as causes of the residual welfare state (Alesina et al. 2001), the
experiences of Britain, Italy and Spain suggest a different causal relationship: that higher
immigration serves to compensate for shortcomings in the welfare state rather than to undercut it.
This means that there may in fact not be any inherent conflict between immigration,
multiculturalism and generous welfare spending (whether such an argument is based on cultural
requisites or rational economic reasoning). On the other hand, moves to restrict immigration --
not just in Germany but also in many of the corporatist welfare states of Northern Europe -- may
have much more to do with the failure to integrate low-skilled immigrant populations into the
labor market (which is more likely to turn them into welfare recipients). Germany´s past
restrictions on citizenship for the children of immigrants, its past policies favoring low skill
immigration, and other factors such as restrictions to product market competition (which prevent
the creation of small businesses by immigrants as a way to economic integration) are thus likely
to be far more important than the features of the German welfare state.  
All this suggests that the implications of immigration for parties of the Left are likely to depend
on a plethora of factors that determine the way in which immigration impacts the lives of other
citizens. This includes not just the choices that other parties (in particular on the Right) make in
politicizing the issue. It also involves the politics of the welfare state (although in much more
complex ways than simple theories of welfare chauvinism would have), the characteristics of
labor and product markets (both matters of government regulation in other areas), and past
policies that have affected the characteristics of the immigrant population and its degree of
economic and social integration. In this regard, past German governments of both the Left and
the Right, with their insistence on restricting long-term avenues of integration (including the
attainment of citizenship by the children of immigrants or the ability of asylum seekers to obtain
employment) seem to have created a climate that has made it more difficult for the Left to
advance a new type of immigration policy in recent years than has been true for governments of
the Left in our other three cases. 
Such qualifications of how the politics of immigration might differ for center-left parties across
Europe nonetheless beg the question of whether large scale immigration does not put the Left at a
consistent electoral disadvantage vis à vis parties of the Right. The electoral tensions that
immigration involves specifically for the Left may mean that the issue can easily be exploited by
parties on the Right for electoral gain without much cost. In particular in countries where an
anti-immigrant far Right has emerged (as in the case of Italy, discussed above, or in the case of
France) it can be argued that the mainstream Right has successfully exploited the issue to its
advantage in the face of a Left hamstrung by its internal tensions.
17  In the case of Italy, for
instance, mobilization of anti-immigrant sentiment played an important role in the Right’s return
to power in 2001, even though Berlusconi went on to oversee a substantial increase in legal
immigration levels, appeasing his populist partners through tougher deportation standards and
15new requirements for legal immigration entailed in the Bossi-Fini law.  Sarkozy’s 2007 victory
over Ségolène Royal has been at least partially attributed to his tough, often controversial stance
on immigration and immigrants, or the children of immigrants.
18  And in Germany, the staunch
commitment of the CDU and CSU to block plans for a new, skilled-based labor immigration
policy has been credited for helping bring about the Christian Democrats sequence of regional
electoral victories in Hesse in 1999 and then 2003, Lower Saxony in 2003 and, most importantly,
North Rhine-Westphalia in 2005. The last of these brought down the last Red/Green state
government and prompted the federal elections that brought an end to the Left coalition
government.
19    
However, while politicizing immigration may indeed tend to work predominantly in favor of the
Right in the short-term given the particular tensions it creates for the Left, it is not costless or
unproblematic for the mainstream Right. An uncompromising stance on immigration, such as
that pursued by segments of the CDU and CSU during the years of the Red/Green coalition, can
result in ideological tensions within the Right. Such tensions, both between different CDU
regional leaders and between the party and church organizations, were evident during the
prolonged negotiations of a compromise between the Schroeder government and the CDU
following the failure of the first Schily law.
20   It also tends to be opposed by business, a key
constituency of the mainstream Right parties. This was evidenced both in the German case,
where the German business organizations lobbied aggressively in favor of the Schroeder
governments efforts to re-open work-based immigration, and in Italy, where requirement of prior
work contracts for residence permits imposed by the Bossi-Fini law was opposed by business.
21
“Tough talk” on immigration is thus likely to result in less actual immigration restriction during
periods of mainstream Right government than the electoral rhetoric of the Right might imply.
This, in turn, should ease the amount of political pressure to restrict immigration that political
victories by the center-right might otherwise produce. 
The examples considered here suggest that, while the potential for mobilization of anti-
immigrant sentiment by the Right in Europe is real (note the electoral success of the Northern
League in an area of Italy whose industrial economy depends entirely on immigrant labor), this
does not lock the Left into an inescapable choice between restricting immigration and permanent
electoral defeat. In Spain (2008) and Britain (2001 and 2005), the Left succeeded electorally
after implementing very liberal immigration policies and running in the face of efforts by the
Right to politicize the issue. And in Italy, the Left won in 2006 running on a promise to lift the
first Berlusconi government’s measure to require work contracts for the issuance of new
residence permits.  In Germany, on the other hand, the political pressure to restrict immigration
appears largely to be a function of the low-skill profile of early immigrant labor recruitment
policies coupled with that country´s unique problems in creating jobs for low skilled workers.
And something similar may be true for France. 
On the other hand, in all four countries, governments of the Left have actively sought to shape
the profile of their immigrant populations in ways that fit the needs of their economies and
consequently minimize the tension that immigration creates in their electorate. Indeed, while it is
now being copied by the Right (for instance, the Sarkozy government in France), the move to fit
immigration policy to other economic policy goals (in particular raising the skills profile of the
EU’s labor force) is one in which governments of the center-left have played a leading role, Blair
´s managed migration model and the German Red/Green coalition’s proposal for a points based
system being two examples. One way to understand this is as an effort by the center-left to
16mitigate potential electoral dilemmas.  Nonetheless, the choice in favor of such pragmatism over
a rights-based approach to immigration may be problematic in other respects. At the least it poses
a serious question as to how the European Left will ultimately reconcile its definition of borders
among peoples and its commitment to universalism.  And it cannot be overlooked that the choice
to promote high-skilled migration into the EU to ease electoral tensions and resolve Europe´s
demographic problems presents a moral quandary for the Left regarding the impact that drawing
human capital away from labor-exporting “third” countries is likely to have on poorer areas of
the world.  
If a more selective, labor-market based approach to immigration appears to be the option that
best fits the political needs of Left party governments in Europe, a constellation in which a
majority of states are governed by Left party governments might be the most likely scenario
under which the kind of common immigration aimed centered on labor market needs that has
been called for by the EU Commission might succeed. Indeed, the constellation need not be
perfect. If the recent past is any indication forward looking Left governments in countries with
more generous welfare states could find important allies in Italy and Spain, whether those
countries are governed by the Left or the Right.  Any such prospect, of course, would require the
end of the current economic crisis and a significant recovery in European labor markets. 
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Foreign Citizens residing in EU15 countries 
Source: Eurostat, Population and Social Conditions Statistics, Extracted from the
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22Notes
231Inglehart (1971) links post-materialism to the emergence of a cosmopolitan political
identity and sense of social solidarity. 
2 Following the last two EU enlargements, many of the traditional EU member states also
experienced significant immigration from new EU member states, including Poland and
Romania. The distinction here is drawn because intra-EU migration cannot be directly restricted
beyond a transition period following a home country’s accession to the EU.  Most of the leeway
for controlling immigration that EU governments have involves immigrants who are not citizens
of other EU member states. 
3 See for instance Hammar (1999), p. 174 on Sweden, Campell (1992), pp. 451-56 on
Switzerland, and Castles (1986). 
4Regierungserklärung des zweiten Kabinetts Brandt/Scheel vom 18. Januar 1973 (Bonn:
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1973), p. 46. Author’s translation. 
5
 Germany and Austria’s foreign born population  proportions well outranked France ‘s (at
8.1%) and even Britain’s (at 9.7%) in 2005. See OECD (2007). 
6
 See Maier-Braun (2006). Schmidt made the statement at a press conference  on November 11,
1981.
7 The perception that German society would not be able to integrate Muslim immigrants
in particular was often articulated by the chancellor, including in some of this later day
recollections of this period. See   “Altkanzler Schmidt: The Anwerbung von
Gastarbeitern war falsch,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 24, 2004.  See also
“Helmut Schmidt: Multikulturelle Gesellschaft ‘Illusion von Intellektuellen,” Die Zeit,
April 22, 2004. 
8
  Roger Cohen, “Schroeder´s New Politics Tripped up by Hesse Voters,” NYT, February 8, 1999.
9
 This figure is calculated by subtracting the pre-2000 level of roughly 50 thousand
naturalizations per year from the higher figures that followed in the 6 years following the
new citizenship law before naturalization figures returned to their historical path.
10 For details on the course of the negotiations of the first Schily Law, see the monthly
EFMS (Europäisches Forum für Migrationsstudien) Migration Reports for October 2001
to June 2002. 
11 The addition of these new criteria was also mandated by an EU directive.  For more
details on the second immigration law taking effect January 1
st, 2005, see the EFMS
Migration Report for July 2004. 
12 The restrictive turn in Labour´s stance on immigration is widely attributed to the lessons
drawn from an unexpected defeat in the Labour stronghold district of Smethwick to a
Conservative candidate running on  an anti-immigrant platform in the 1964 election (seeKarapin 1999).  According to Hansen (1999), it also reflected “a triumph of Callaghan’s
strand of Labour ideology - nationalist,  anti-intellectual, indifferent to international law
and obligation and firmly in touch with the social conservatism of of middle- and
working-class Britain (p.822)
13 Estimates of Italy´s illegal immigrant population vary widely, ranging from as few as
200 thousand up to one million (Jandl, 2008).
14  The Economist, “Mission by Sea over Illegal Migrants,¨ May 3
rd, 2008. 
15Actual permits issued consistently exceed the quotas, which are used to negotiate
controls on illegal immigration with sending countries.
16 In the case of Italy,  the immigrant offices of the labor unions play an important role in
facilitating the integration of immigrants, and in the case of “self-employed” immigrants,
sanction their applications for residence permits (see  Veikou and Triandafyllidou 2004).
In Spain, annual quotas for work-based immigration are set following consultation with
employers and unions.  
17
 I thank George Ross for putting this point to me. 
18
See David Rieff, “Battle over the Banlieus,” New York Times Magazine, April 15, 2007”
and “ Immigration : Malaise et surenchère,”  Le Monde, March 20, 2007. 
19
Markus Deggerich, „Einwanderung: Die Angst der Parteien vor der Wahl,“ Der Spiegel,
January 30, 2001. 
20
 See for instance EFMS Migration Report, January and February 2003, Ette (2003), pp.
41046,  and Charles Hawley, “Letter from Berlin: German Conservatives Bicker over
Integration (Again),” Der Spiegel Online International, January 2, 2008. Another prominent
example is offered by the conflict between the French Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua and the Social
Affairs Minister, Simone Weil, which resulted in a serious rift within the Balladur government in 1993. See
Hollified (1999).  
21
 EFMS Migration Reports March 2001 and January 2002,  Ette (2003), and Migration
News  (University of California, Davis), v. 8:4, October 2002. 